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NOTES
CHRIS-CRAFT AND LOSS OF OPPORTUNITY TO CONTROL:
THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of the tender offer' as a device for effecting corporate takeovers
came of age in the United States in the late 1960s. 2 Indeed, appropriate
regulatory legislation-the Williams Act-was adopted only as recently as
1968. 3 Prior to that time, a regulatory gap existed which in part accounted for
the relative popularity of tender offers. 4 The dearth of regulation permitted
acquiring corporations to limit their disclosures and thereby gain an element
of surprise.5
The Williams Act was intended to put regulation of cash tender offers on
the same footing as regulation of proxy contests 6 and other forms of takeov-
ers. 7 Not surprisingly, the Williams Act created a new series of questions
concerning civil liability under the securities laws. Section 14(e)8 of the
1. Tender offers are definable as "[tlhe technique of acquiring control of a corporation by
making a public offer to purchase part of the corporation's stock at a fixed price--usually ...
representing a premium above market." Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender
Offer, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 317 (1967).
2. See, e.g., Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 793 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970). During 1960 there were only eight cash tender offers reported.
By comparison, during the first six months of 1966 alone there were thirty-two reported.
Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 1, at 317; see Broder v. Dane, 384 F. Supp. 1312 (S.D.N.Y.
1974). See generally 34 SEC Ann. Rep. 9-10 (1968).
3. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 781, m, n
(1964) (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(i), m(d) & (e), n(d), (e) & (f) (1970).
4. "When control is sought through the proxy contest, the Exchange Act and its proxy rules
require disclosure to be made to shareholders concerning the identity of the participants in the
contest, their associates, the shareholdings of these persons, and other relevant information....
Similarly, when control is sought through a stock-for-stock exchange, the offering must be
registered under the Securities Act of 1933, and shareholders must be given a prospectus setting
forth all material facts. Until July 1968, however, there were no comparable disclosure require-
ments which applied to a cash tender offer or stock acquisitions which may cause a change in
control." 34 SEC Ann. Rep. 10 (1968); see Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer"
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1250, 1253-54 (1973).
5. Note, supra note 4, at 1254.
6. 34 SEC Ann. Rep. 9-10 (1968); see Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 1, at 318-19. Proxy
contests are regulated by § 14 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970), and by SEC rules
promulgated pursuant thereto, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to -103 (1974).
7. 34 SEC Ann. Rep. 9-10 (1968). See generally Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 1, at
318-22. For example, exchange offers, like other public offers to buy or sell securities, are
regulated under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970).
8. Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act provides in part: "It shall be unlawful for any person to
make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not
misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in
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Exchange Act-the anti-fraud provision included in the Williams Act 9 -
entitles a new group of private parties to recover as a result of fraudulent
conduct. While doubt surrounded the standing of target corporations10 and
competing tender offerors"' to sue another tender offeror under lOb-S, 12 such
plaintiffs dearly have standing under section 14(e). 13
Thus, the courts faced a major new problem: how to measure damages
suffered by an injured tender offeror as a result of section 14(e) violations.
Where defrauded purchasers or sellers sue under rule 10b-5, courts often
analogize to measures of damages well settled under the common law of
fraud. 14 When a defeated tender offeror sues its victorious adversary under
connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security
holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)
(1970).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970).
10. Several cases denied standing in this situation under rule lob-S. Greater Iowa Corp. v.
McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 791-92 (8th Cir. 1967); Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. D. Kaltman &
Co., 283 F. Supp. 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Pacific Ins. Co. v. Blot, 267 F. Supp. 956 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); see Bound Brook Water Co. v. Jaffe, 284 F. Supp. 702, 709 (D.N.J.), amended complaint
dismissed, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 92,243 (D.N.J. 1968); cf.
Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 425 F.2d 842, 843 n.1 (2d Cir.
1970) (question left open); General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969) (question left open). Contra, Moore v. Greatamerica
Corp., 274 F. Supp. 490 (N.D. Ohio 1967); Dodge Mfg. Corp. v. Emerson Elec. Co., [1966-1967
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 91,962 (N.D. Ind. 1967) (motion for temporary
restraining order) (by implication). See generally Bromberg, The Securities Law of Tender Offers,
15 N.Y.L.F. 459, 552-53 (1969).
11. This question had not been decided definitively prior to the passage of the Williams Act.
See Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 909 (1970) (action against target-no standing); cf. Duplan Corp. v. Iroquois Indus., Inc.,
[1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 92,318 (W.D.N.Y. 1968) (no standing;
semble alternative grounds).
12. Rule 10b-5 provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly .... (a)
To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1974). For a general treatment of standing under rule 10b-S see Comment, lob-S Standing Under
Birnbaum: The Case of the Missing Remedy, 24 Hastings L.J. 1007 (1973).
13. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 358-62 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 910, 924 (1973), on remand, 384 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), appeal
docketed, No. 74-2542, 2d Cir., Nov. 26, 1974 (competing tender offeror); Electronic Specialty
Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969) (target).
14. E.g., Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1173 (2d Cir. 1970) (defrauded
buyer, difference between purchase price and resale price); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 104"S
(10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969) (defrauded buyers; out of pocket rule applied
with actual value determined at time of discovery of fraud); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781,
786-87 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965) (defrauded seller, out of pocket rule applied).
Not every transaction may be so easily reduced to measurable damages. See, e.g., Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154-57 (1972) (value of stock approximated where no
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section 14(e), however, new considerations involving the relative worth of
majority and minority interests are introduced into the damages equation.
The first significant attempt to measure damages where a contestant has
been unfairly deprived of the opportunity to gain control of a target corpora-
tion occurred in protracted litigation arising from the contest for control of
Piper Aircraft Corporation (Piper) waged between Chris-Craft Industries
(CCI) and Bangor Punta Corporation (BPC). Is This Note shall examine
in detail the Chris-Craft decisions, focusing particularly on the measure of
compensatory damages finally fixed on remand to the Southern District of
New York.1 6 This measure of damages will be analyzed in terms of the legal
and practical considerations which the court included, or more importantly,
should have included in its determination of CCI's damages.
II. THE Chris-Craft LITIGATION
CCI began making purchases of Piper stock in late 1968, and by early 1969
held 13 percent of Piper's outstanding shares. CCI then resorted to a cash
tender offer, followed by an exchange tender offer, and increased its holdings
of Piper stock to 41 percent, less than it needed for control. 17 Meanwhile,
Piper, in an effort to thwart the CCI takeover bid, reached agreement with
BPC under which BPC acquired the Piper family shares (31 percent). BPC,
through open market purchases and an exchange offer, finally obtained a 51
percent controlling interest in Piper. 18 However, the Second Circuit deter-
mined that BPC acquired 14 percent of these holdings by violations of section
more definite indicator available); Gottlieb v. Sandia Am. Corp., 304 F. Supp. 980, 989-92 (E.D.
Pa. 1969), aff'd in part & rev'd in part on other grounds, 452 F.2d 510 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 938 (1971) (rescission ordered because of difficulty of determining damages).
15. In chronological order, the reported opinions are Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 303 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd sub nom. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v.
Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970) (en banc) (denial of preliminary injunction);
SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), modified, 480 F.2d 341,
383-84 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 924 (1973) (SEC allegations of market manipulation and
securities fraud by BPC); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1128
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, 480 F.2d 341, 355-80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910, 924 (1973)
[hereinafter, wherever ambiguous, cited as Chris-Craft I], on remand, 384 F. Supp. 507
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) [hereinafter, wherever ambiguous, cited as Chris-Craft II], appeal docketed,
No. 74-2542, 2d Cir. Nov. 26, 1974 (CCI complaint against BPC, Piper, and First Boston and
their respective officers alleging sale of unregistered securities, market manipulation, securities
fraud and violations of rule 10b-6; see note 19 infra); Bangor Punta Corp. v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 480 F.2d 341, 380-83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 910 (1973) (BPC complaint against CCI alleging market manipulation, securities fraud, and
violations of rule 10b-6; see note 19 infra).
16. 384 F. Supp. at 523. Although other antifraud actions by defeated tender offerors have
reached the courts, only Chris-Craft has yielded an opinion on a defeated tender offeror's
damages.
17. Chris-Craft I, 480 F.2d at 350-51. More extensive factual treatment of the takeover battle
is found at id. at 349-55; see 337 F. Supp. at 1130-32; Comment, Chris-Craft and Section 14(e):
The Expansion of Lead Underwriters' Liability, 42 Fordham L. Rev. 820, 820-22 (1974).
18. Chris-Craft I, 480 F.2d at 352-55.
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14(e) and rule lb-6.19 By the time BPC attained the majority position, 94
percent of the Piper shares were owned either by BPC or CCI, thereby
removing whatever market had existed, and leaving CCI in what effectively
became a minority position in a closely held corporation. 20 The Second
Circuit concluded as a matter of law that BPC's section 14(e) violations
deprived CCI of the opportunity to compete for control of Piper. 2' Noting
that CCI no longer wished control of Piper and sought only damages for the
fraudulent deprivation of its opportunity to control, 22 the court held that
The measure of damages should be the reduction in the appraisal value of CCI's
Piper holdings attributable to BPC's taking a majority position and reducing CCI to a
minority position, and thus being able to compel a merger at any time.33
In addition, the court included an injunction barring BPC from voting its
illegally obtained shares for a period of at least five years. 24 The purposes of
19. Id. at 373-77. In its statements filed with the SEC, BPC listed one of its assets, the
Bangor & Arastook Railroad (BAR), at a value of $18.4 million, despite the fact that BPC was
then negotiating the sale of BAR for $5 million. This sale resulted in a loss of 12% of BPC
shareholders' aggregate book equity, leading the district court to conclude that BPC's public
filings were "misleading in [their] failure to disclose the circumstances surrounding the negotia-
tions for sale of the BAR interest," and thus illegal under § 14(e). 331 F. Supp. at 1162; see
Chris-Craft I, 480 F.2d at 373-75; Comment, supra note 17, at 821.
The Second Circuit also affirmed the lower court's holding (337 F. Supp. at 114142) that
BPC's open market purchases of another 7% of Piper stock constituted violations of rule lOb-6,
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1974) (proscribes bids or purchases by or on behalf of the issuer of
securities when such securities are the subject of a public distribution). 480 F.2d at 377-79.
20. BPC acquired 51% of Pipers shares, while CCI-after further small open market
purchases-owned 43%. 480 F.2d at 354-55. This left only 6% of Pipers shares owned by the
general public, making CCI's investment many times larger than the largest possible floating
supply. See notes 134-40 infra and accompanying text. Before the competition, 69% of the
Piper shares were publicly owned, the other 31% belonging to the Piper family. 480 F.2d at 350,
353.
21. 480 F.2d at 373-77.
22. Id. at 379.
23. Id. at 380. The court also pointed out that its directions should not preclude the granting
of such additional relief as might be necessary. Id. The district court therefore considered
whether CCI was entitled to consequential damages for being "locked into" an allegediy unsalable
minority interest. The court held that such damages are awardable only upon a "dear showing of
causal connection" between defendants' conduct and the alleged consequence, and that CCI had
not made such a showing. Chris-Craft II, 384 F. Supp. at 526; see Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg.
Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 803 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973). The court also denied
plaintiff's request for a grant of attorneys' fees, reasoning that they should be recoverable only
where service of the public interest was a primary motivation for plaintiffs. 384 F. Supp. at 528.
The court did grant prejudgment interest to CCI for its compensatory damages. Id. at 526-28.
24. 480 F.2d at 380. Courts look favorably upon injunctive relief under § 14(e), although such
relief is more easily obtained at a preliminary stage in the litigation. See, e.g., Electronic
Specialty Co. v. international Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 947 (2d Cir. 1969).
The Second Circuit also considered the possibility of divestiture but rejected it as impractical
due to the extent of Pipers integration into BPC's operations. 480 F.2d at 379; accord, FTC v.
PepsiCo, Inc., 477 F.2d 24, 28-31 (2d Cir. 1973); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International
Controls Corp., supra at 947. But see Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787
803-04 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970) (consummation of the transaction could
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the court in granting relief were twofold: to compensate CCI for the injury it
had suffered, and to deny to BPC "the fruits of obtaining Piper shares
illegally."'
25
On remand, the district court determined that the value of each share held
by CCI had been reduced by $2.40 on the date when opportunity to control
was lost, and awarded damages based on that finding.26 This amounted to
five percent 27 of the appraisal value ($48) of the shares on that date, 28
reflecting the court's estimate of the speculative nature of CCI's opportunity
to control. 29 Defendants had urged that no damages be awarded. They
reasoned that in a contest of this type, the value of victory would be so small
and the uncertainty of attaining it so great that no one would be willing to
pay a premium over market value for CCI's holdings (42 percent), assuming
BPC's non-fraudulently acquired position (37 percent). 30 Plaintiffs, on the
other hand, argued for a measure of damages based on the prices that the
contestants were willing to pay during the contest for control, which would
have yielded damages between $17 and $32 per share. 3 1
Finally, the court enjoined BPC from voting the 14 percent of Piper's
shares that it had acquired illegally for the minimum five year period
prescribed by the court of appeals, reasoning that the purpose of such an
injunction was to deprive BPC of control, not to further reward CCI. 32
not be allowed to prevent divestiture if it were proper relief for the situation). See also Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 386 (1970).
25. 480 F.2d at 380.
26. 384 F. Supp. at 523.
27. Id.
28. A $48 per share appraisal value was arrived at by discarding the highest and lowest
estimates of the experts who had testified, and then averaging the remaining estimates. Id. at
517.
29. The court found the value of the control premium in the Piper situation to be between 5%
and 10% of fair market value. Id. at 523; see notes 90-97 infra and accompanying text. However,
the court recognized that the opportunity to control was not worth as much as the actual control
position, and therefore the premium was set at 5% above fair market value. 384 F. Supp. at 523.
30. Defendants' Post-Trial Memorandum With Respect to Damages at 40-41, Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 384 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), appeal docketed, No.
74-2542, 2d Cir., Nov. 26, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Defendants' Memorandum].
31. Plaintiffs Post-Trial Memorandum at 22-27, Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 384 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), appeal docketed, No. 74-2542, 2d Cir., Nov. 26, 1974
[hereinafter cited as Plaintiffs Memorandum]. Plaintiff argued: "[I]n calculating damages in an
action under the securities laws, the starting point is the cost of the plaintiffs shares." Plaintiffs
Reply Brief on Appeal at 9, Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., appeal docketed,
No. 74-2542, 2d Cir., Nov. 26, 1974. Such a measure would have granted CCI damages from an
average purchase price of $64 per share. Id. Alternatively, CCI argued that "(w)here a wrongdoer
places a value on the property it damages, the Court may not substitute a lower subjective
value." Id. at 10. Applying this measure, CCI's damages would have been the reduction In the
value of its shares from the $80 figure that BPC was willing to pay. Id. at 9-10. Finally, CCI
argued that, at the least, it should recover based on a starting point of either cost or value,
whichever figure was greater. Id. at 9-10; accord, Memorandum of the SEC as Amicus Curiae at
11-13, Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., appeal docketed, No. 74-2542, 2d Cir.,
Nov. 26, 1974. The district court does not seem to have even addressed these possibilities.
32. 384 F. Supp. at 523-26.
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Plaintiff, pointing out the depressed state of the light aircraft industry, had
argued for a longer injunction on the grounds that a five year injunction
would merely saddle CCI with the responsibilities of Piper during the de-
pressed period, only to turn it over to BPC at a time when its fortunes and the
economic outlook would be considerably brighter. 33
III. BASES FOR RELIEF IN TENDER OFFER SITUATIONS
Private actions for damages have long been recognized as being one means
of effectively enforcing the securities laws.34 The rationale behind this "neces-
sary supplement to Commission action ' 3S was espoused by the Supreme
Court in Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp.:36
The power to enforce implies the power to make effective the right of recovery
afforded by the [Securities Act of 1933]. And the power to make the right of recovery
effective implies the power to utilize any of the procedures or actions normally
available to the litigant according to the exigencies of the particular case. 7
Determination of damages in a purchaser-seller or defrauded tendering
shareholder situation poses no insurmountable problems. 38 In these situations
damages are measured according to the "out-of-pocket" rule.3 9 Under this
rule, the defrauded purchaser is entitled to recover the difference between the
price paid for the securities and the value of the securities determined at the
time of purchase. 40 The defrauded seller may recover the difference between
actual value and the price he received. 4 ' A defrauded tenderer, in effect a
seller, would get the seller's measure of damages.4 2 These standards do not
33. Plaintiff's Memorandum 114-16.
34. E.g., Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 (d Cir. 1951); see Comment,
The Prospects for Rule X-10B-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 Yale L.J.
1120, 1133-35 (1950).
35. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
36. 311 U.S. 282 (1940).
37. Id. at 288 (emphasis deleted), quoted with approval in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S.
426, 433-34 (1964). See also Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 381-83 (1970).
38. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 238-39 (7th Cir. 1974); Chasins v,
Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1173 (2d Cir. 1970); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 105
(10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969); see note 14 supra.
40. E.g., Gottlieb v. Sandia Am. Corp., 304 F. Supp. 980, 989 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd in part
& rev'd in part on other grounds, 452 F.2d 510 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 938 (1971). Some
courts vary this measure by granting the difference between the price paid and the value at the
time of discovery of the fraud. E.g., Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 105 (10th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969).
41. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972). As with purchasers'
remedies, some courts measure a defrauded seller's remedies as the difference between the price
received and the highest value reached by the security within a reasonable time after discovery of
the fraudulent conduct. E.g., Fridrich v. Bradford, [Current Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
94,723, at 96,406-07 (M.D. Tenn. June 17, 1974).
42. E.g., Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 585 (E.D.N.Y.
1971). In addition to the remedy of damages, rescission is always available to defrauded
purchasers, sellers, and tenderers. See, e.g., Gordon v. Burr, [Current Binder] CCH Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. 94,874, at 96,981 (2d Cir., Nov. 20, 1974) (purchaser given opportunity to rescind for
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avail the defeated takeover contestant, who has neither purchased nor sold
securities in reliance on its opponent's fraudulent conduct. 43
The denial of the opportunity to compete for control is analogous to the
common law tort of interference with prospective advantage. 4 Generally,
this tort embraces the intentional nonprivileged interference with plaintiffs
future contr.actual relations where the probability of plaintiff's economic
benefit from such relations is not so small that damages based thereon would
be speculative. 4s As Dean Prosser wrote:
In such cases there is a background of business experience on the basis of which it is
possible to estimate with some fair amount of success both the value of what has been
lost and the likelihood that the plaintiff would have received it if the defendant had
not interfered. 46
Even where the opportunity is that of winning a prize, the damages are based
upon the amount of profit that might have been realized and the chance that
the injured party had of winning. 47
The value of opportunity lost through defendant's breach is also recognized
in the law of contracts. According to Professor Corbin:
Where a contract right is conditional upon the happening of some uncertain event and
the breach by the promisor makes it impossible to determine with reasonable certainty
whether or not the event would have occurred if there had been no breach, the
rule 10b-5 violation); Broder v. Dane, 384 F. Supp. 1312 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (shareholders who
tendered shares as a result of non-disclosure given opportunity to rescind under § 14(e)); Gottlieb
v. Sandia Am. Corp., 304 F. Supp. 980, 990-92 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd in part and rev'd in part
on other grounds, 452 F.2d 510 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 938 (1971) (rescission ordered as
part of the measure of damages).
43. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 375 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973), on remand, 384 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), appeal docketed,
No. 74-2542, 2d Cir., Nov. 26, 1975.
44. Id. at 360.
45. See W. Prosser, Torts § 130, at 949-62 (4th ed. 1971).
46. Id. at 950; see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 912, comment d at 110 (Tent. Draft No.
19, 1973), which indicates that it is essential to the recovery of compensatory damages that the
injured person prove that the enterprise was or was likely to be profitable and that the chance for
profits has been interfered with. Id. Illustration 14 to § 912 is illuminating as to lost opportunity
in a competitive situation:
"A is conducting a manufacturing business in which the net profits are approximately $50,000
per year. B, a competitor, is guilty of unfair trade practices and the demand for A's goods begins
to fall off instead of to increase as had been true hitherto. Some of the changes may be ascribed to
competition by new competitors. The amount of harm which has been done by B cannot be told
with any substantial degree of accuracy. A is nevertheless entitled to compensatory damages
based upon such facts and figures as are reasonably available." Id. at 113; accord, Fitt v.
Schneidewind Realty Corp., 81 N.J. Super. 497, 196 A.2d 26 (L. Div. 1963).
47. W. Prosser, supra note 45, § 130, at 950-51; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 912,
comment fat 114 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973). The leading case is Chaplin v. Hicks, (191112 K.B.
786 (plaintiff awarded damages for loss of the opportunity to compete in a beauty contest, when
she had been chosen as one of the fifty finalists). See also Wachtel v. National Alfalfa J. Co., 190
Iowa 1293, 176 N.W. 801 (1920).
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promisee can recover damages measured by the market value of the conditional right
at the time of breach.4 8
Although the cases have been infrequent, they have been consistent: a most
critical factor is the certainty of the plaintiff's claim. 49 Where the claim is
purely speculative it will be disallowed. S But if reasonable estimates of
probability can be made, then the courts will evaluate the lost opportunity."1
In summary, resort to common law principles demonstrates that a defeated
tender offeror's theory of damages begins with the value of its possibly
controlling interest, discounted by the improbability of its attaining control
absent fraud. Attention must now center on the components of both the basic
evaluation and the discount factor.
IV. VALUATION OF THE LOST OPPORTUNITY TO CONTROL
"Control" has been variously defined as a corporate asset S2 and not a
corporate asset,5 3 as the capacity to choose directors, S4 as an office and not a
person, s s as an attribute of stock ownership,5 6 and as the signification of
wealth, prestige and the power to dictate corporate policy.5 7 To a controlling
stockholder it is an instrument that he can use.5 8 To the minority shareholder,
however, it represents the fiduciary duty that operates to protect his invest-
ment, an investment over which he has little or no control.5 9 In all events,
however, control itself transfers at a premium when the seller demands one.
Purchasers would find a control position worth a premium over market
price for a variety of reasons. Sometimes there is a desire to exploit the
48. 5 A. Corbin, Contracts § 1030, at 185 (1964); see Restatement of Contracts § 332, at 521
(1932).
49. See W. Prosser, supra note 45, § 130, at 950; 46 Harv. L. Rev. 696 (1933).
50. E.g., Farabee-Treadwell Co. v. Union & Planters' Bank & Trust Co., 135 Tenn. 208, 186
S.W. 92 (1916) (claim of damage due to lost profits in a fluctuating grain market disallowed as
speculative).
51. E.g., Air Technology Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 347 Mass. 613, 199 N.E.2d 538 (1964)
(damages recoverable to the extent they are ascertainable).
52. Bayne, A Philosophy of Corporate Control, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 22, 67 (1963).
53. Christophides v. Porco, 289 F. Supp. 403, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
54. Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1212 (1958).
55. Bayne, supra note 52, at 30.
56. Christophides v. Porco, 289 F. Supp. 403, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
57. Comment, Sales of Corporate Control At a Premium: An Analysis and Suggested
Approach, 1961 Duke L.J. 554.
58. E.g., Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 184 (D. Conn. 1952), rev'd, 219 F.2d 173
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955); see Bayne, The Noninvestment Value of Control
Stock, 45 Ind. L.J. 317, 320-21 (1970); Bayne, The Definition of Corporate Control, 9 St. Louis
L.J. 445 (1965).
59. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1919); Gerdes v. Reynolds,
28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 650 (Sup. CL 1941); Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic
Illegitimacy, 47 Texas L. Rev. 215, 220 (1969); Bayne, A Legitimate Transfer of Control: The
Weyenberg Shoe-Florsheim Case Study, 18 Stan. L. Rev. 438, 442-43 (1966); Leech, Transac-
tions in Corporate Control, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 725 (1956).
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acquisition for the acquiror's benefit. The courts60 and the commentators 61
have been unanimous in decrying such situations. The legitimate benefits of
control, however, are sufficient to command a premium. Paramount here is
the ability to "control ... your own destiny. '62 The prestige of control must
also command some increment. 63 More important, however, are the ability to
dictate corporate policy and direction, the ability to assume management
positions with all the benefits they contain, the use of corporate property, and
the ability to arrange mergers and consolidations. Finally, the acquiror will
pay for his chance to improve the target's profitability, which would raise the
market value of his investment."
Control premiums have developed in varying fact situations. 65 In the first
pattern, non-voting shareholders compensate voting shareholders who have
relinquished exclusive voting privileges. 66 Premiums paid in such cases are
sometimes staggering.67 A leading case in this category is Manacher v.
Reynolds. 68 There, the Reynolds family held all voting stock of Foil, a
holding company which owned 50.09 percent of the outstanding voting shares
of Reynolds Metals. 69 Under a reorganization plan merging Foil into Metals,
each Foil voting share (class A) was to be exchanged for three shares of a new
class of voting stock, while the non-voting shares (class B) were to be
exchanged one-for-one. 70 The Reynolds family holdings, including the shares
exchanged for both the class A and the class B shares, increased from 14.2
percent of the net worth of Metals to 17.4 percent, 7' an increase of 19 percent
over their prior holdings. The entire increase, however, was the result of the
"3 for 1 premium" '72 on the class A shares, since all class B holders, including
60. E.g., Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1933) (see
note 82 infra and accompanying text); Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa.
410, 76 A. 77 (1910) (president sold control to outsider when he knew transaction was against best
interests of corporation). See also Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (directors
sold control to outsiders who then looted corporation's assets).
61. E.g., Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1956); Leech, supra
note 59, at 779-96.
62. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 31, at 105.
63. Bayne, The Noninvestment Value of Control Stock, 45 Ind. L.J. 317, 325 (1970).
64. Id. at 322-26.
65. Prior to Chris-Craft, control premiums have been usually paid in non-contest situations.
In such settings, the premium value is greatly enhanced. See notes 66-77 infra and accompanying
text.
66. E.g., Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 309 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
941 (1963).
67. E.g., in Honigman, the common stock was divided into two classes; these had equal
equity and dividend rights, but only one had voting rights. During a reorganization under which
voting rights were given to the previously non-voting shares, one voting share could be
exchanged for 1000 new shares, while the old non-voting shares were to be exchanged one-for-
one. This amounted to a 100,000% premium. Id. at 669.
68. 39 Del. Ch. 401, 165 A.2d 741 (Del. Ch. 1960).
69. Id. at 404, 165 A.2d at 743. See notes 70-73 infra and accompanying text.
70. 39 Del. Ch. at 408, 165 A.2d at 745.
71. See id. at 406, 165 A.2d at 744.
72. Id. at 413, 165 A.2d at 748.
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the Reynolds family, exchanged their shares at a one-to-one ratio. The court
approved the reorganization, concluding that the "overwhelming" approval of
the plan by those shareholders not connected with the Reynolds family
demonstrated its fairness.
73
In a second group of cases, control passes from one group of shareholders to
another. In Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 7 4 the president of Republic
Pictures sold his controlling interest to Essex Universal Corporation. The
Second Circuit declared that receipt of a premium over market price for the
sale of controlling shares involved no impropriety per se. 7 s In Essex, defen-
dant had received a premium of approximately one-third over market;7 6 in
other instances, courts have upheld premiums ranging up to 200 percenL
In determining the value of control to an acquiring corporation, the basic
indicator must be the amount that the corporation is willing to pay over
market value for such control. 78 As Judge Learned Hand stated: "When all is
said, value is nothing more than what people will pay for the shares .... ,,79
Valuation becomes more complex, however, under circumstances involving
tender offers. Situations in which control premiums have been paid in the
past have been much less volatile than in the typical tender offer battle, 0
where other significant factors limiting the controlling party's ability to "use"f
his position freely must be taken into consideration.
Courts have long recognized that the controlling shareholder stands as a
fiduciary of the corporation."' Thus, when a controlling shareholder sells his
stock at a premium knowing that the purchaser intends to expropriate a
corporate opportunity, as in the leading case of Perlman v. Feldmnann,82 he
has been held accountable.8 3 Since Perlman, many commentators have
73. Id. at 424-26, 165 A.2d at 756.
74. 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
75. Id. at 576.
76. Republic's market price was approximately $6 per share; the purchase of Yates' control-
ling interest was to be consummated at $8 per share. Id. at 573.
77. E.g., Levy v. American Beverage Corp., 265 App. Div. 208, 38 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1st Dep't
1942) (stock which sold on the open market for as little as $1.12 per share sold in a 53%
controlling block for $3.50 per share).
78. Cf. Levin v. Mississippi River Corp., 59 F.R.D. 353 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem. sub nom.
Wesson v. Mississippi River Corp., 486 F.2d 1398 (2d Cir. 1973).
79. Borg v. International Silver Co., 11 F.2d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 1925).
80. It is worth noting at this juncture that in Chris-Craft, BPC was willing to exchange first
$79.25 cash, then a stock package worth $80 for each Piper share. Chris-Craft I, 480 F.2d at
351-52. Piper was then trading at $65 per share; the district court on remand found that a
reasonable market value for Piper stock, absent the inflationary factors introduced by the
takeover battle, was $48. 384 F. Supp. at 517. Thus, BPC paid a premium of 23% over a market
price itself 35% above an estimated non-contest market price.
81. E.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S.
483, 492 (1919).
82. 219 F.2d 173, 178 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
83. "Both as director and as dominant stockholder, Feldmann stood in a fiduciary relation-
ship to the corporation and to the minority stockholders as beneficiaries thereof. . . .
. . . T]he responsibility of the fiduciary . . . includes the dedication of his uncorrupted
1975]
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generalized that any control premium represents a corporate asset, and should
therefore be paid directly to the corporation or distributed ratably to all
shareholders. 84 The courts, however, have rejected this theory, limiting
liability to those instances where the sale of control is accomplished in the
context of a breach of the seller's fiduciary duty to the minority. 85
Courts have increasingly protected minority rights.86 This fiduciary duty to
the minority was found in Chris-Craft to bind the victorious tender offeror
even though the minority was composed mainly of the offeror's erstwhile
antagonist. 87 Moreover, as Chris-Craft observed, this minority shareholder is
likely to be bigger, better financed, more aggressive and more capable of
protecting itself than the minority shareholders in the situations discussed
above. 88 The value of control to the newly controlling shareholder declines
accordingly. Finally, the value of control to the victorious tender offeror will
decrease further if the incumbent management opposed and continues to
oppose it. The transition period would necessarily be more difficult, and
hostility towards the "interlopers" would create an atmosphere hindering the
business judgment for the sole benefit of the corporation, in any dealings which may adversely
affect it .... [T]he same rule should apply to his fiduciary duties as majority stockholder, for in
that capacity he chooses and controls the directors, and thus is held to have assumed their
liability." Id. at 175-76 (citations omitted); accord, Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 649-50
(Sup. Ct. 1941). But see Levy v. American Beverage Corp., 265 App. Div. 208, 38 N.Y.S.2d 517
(1st Dep't 1942) (held, where purchasers looted corporation, that sellers of controlling shares were
not fiduciaries of minority shareholders, and were not liable when they did not know purchasers'
intentions).
Perlman precipitated considerable comment when it was decided, and the arguments continue
to this day on how broadly its holding should be taken. See, e.g., Bayne, A Philosophy of
Corporate Control, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 22 (1963); Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 Colum.
L. Rev. 1212 (1958); Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 986 (1957); Jennings,
Trading in Corporate Control, 44 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1956); Leech, Transactions in Corporate
Control, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 725 (1956); Comment, Sales of Corporate Control at a Premium: An
Analysis and Suggested Approach, 1961 Duke L.J. 554; Note, The Sale of Control of the
Widely-Held Corporation and the Strict Trust Doctrine, 59 Iowa L. Rev. 1286 (1974).
84. See Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity In the Sale of Shares, 78
Harv. L. Rev. 505 (1965); Bayne, A Legitimate Transfer of Control: The Weyenberg Shoe-
Florsheim Case Study, 18 Stan. L. Rev. 438 (1966); Berle, supra note 83. But see Hill, supra note
83; Javaras, Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Controlling Shares: A Reply to Professor Andrews,
32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 420 (1965); Comment, supra note 83.
85. "There is no obligation ... to 'share and share alike.' Control is not a corporate asset, but
is rather an attribute of stock ownership." Christophides v. Porco, 289 F. Supp. 403, 405
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (citation omitted).
86. Rams, Judicial Valuation of Dissenting Shareholders' Interests, 8 Lincoln L. Rev. 74,
75-76 (1973); see, e.g., Ferraioli v. Cantor, 281 F. Supp. 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (controlling
stockholder may not use position to take unfair advantage of minority shareholders); Jones v.
H.F. Ahmanson & Co., I Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969) (majority
shareholders have a duty to use good faith and fairness in dealings with minority). See also
Address by Commissioner Sommer, "Going Private": A Lesson in Corporate Responsibility,
[Current Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 80,010 (Nov. 20, 1974).
87. See Chris-Craft II, 384 F. Supp. at 519-21; Bayne, supra note 84, at 325-26.
88. See Chris-Craft II, 384 F. Supp. at 519.
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institution of changes by the new controlling party. If the new management is
unfamiliar with the business, such problems are exacerbated. 8 9
These discounting factors operated in Chris-Craft. Had CCI been victori-
ous, a sizeable BPC minority interest would have been ready to turn to the
courts to protect its interests, and equally ready to exert a limiting effect on
CCrs use of the accoutrements of control. 90 In addition, CCI would have
taken control over the bitter opposition of Piper management. While CCI
might have been able to attract knowledgeable-and loyal-management for
Piper, it could not do so from its own organization. 91 All these factors would
have seriously hindered maximization of the value of control. 92
However, what CCI actually lost was not control itself, but merely the
opportunity to gain control. CCI argued that, with a 42 to 37 percent lead
absent BPC's violations, it was a statistical certainty that it would have been
able to maximize its opportunity.93 However, as defendants pointed out,94
and as the court decided, 95 the tender situation is so volatile and contains so
many factors not amenable to simple statistical reduction that such certain-
ties do not exist. The constantly changing size of the competitive tender
offers, and especially the effect of management support for the BPC bid 96
could defeat "statistical certainties." The court correctly concluded that there
was no certainty that CCI would have been successful in wvinning absolute
control of Piper, and thus no basis on which to award the full control
premium as a measure of the worth of CCI's opportunity to control.
97
V. REDUCTION TO A MINORITY POSITION
A. Theories of Stock Valuation
An award of the value of the opportunity to control does not fully
compensate a fraudulently defeated tender offeror. It must also be compen-
sated because it has been wrongfully relegated to a minority position in the
target corporation. 98 In order to quantify this loss, the value of the stock prior
to reduction to a minority position, absent the artificial stimulation of the
price due to the contest itself, must be determined. The value of a premium
for control or the opportunity to control is an addition to this basic value. 99
89. See generally Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 30, at 35.
90. Donald Gant, an investment banker and witness for defendants, indicated that a
premium under such circumstances would not be "very much." Defendants' Memorandum 35-36.
91. In Chris-Craft, a "wholesale--and expensive-replacement and reorganization of the
Piper corporate management structure" probably would have resulted. Chris-Craft II, 384 F.
Supp. at 519-20.
92. Id. at 519.
93. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 31, at 20-21.
94. Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 30, at 25-26.
95. 384 F. Supp. at 518-19. The court of appeals did not attempt to decide if CCI would have
been successful. Chris-Craft I, 480 F.2d at 378-79.
96. Chris-Craft II, 384 F. Supp. at 521.
97. Id.
98. Chris-Craft I, 480 F.2d at 376.
99. The district court in Chris-Craft determined that the value of CCI's Piper holdings at the
1975]
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Similarly, this basic value must be the starting point of any determination of
loss of value through reduction to a minority position. The amount of this loss
is the difference between the basic value and the value of the tender offeror's
stock after relegation to a minority position in a corporation now controlled
by its adversary. 10 0 This will in turn require an examination of the value of
the block if the tender offeror then seeks to sell the entire block. Depending
on the use of either an appraisal method or a market-oriented method, the
damages may vary considerably.
Pennsylvania law controlled in Chris-Craft. 11 Following the generally
accepted appraisal principles, courts apply an appraisal formula which con-
siders three basic factors in arriving at a share's value: 10 2 net asset value, or
"the share which the stock represents in the value of the net assets of the
corporation; '"10 3 investment value, "an estimate of present worth in light of
past, present, and prospective financial records of the company ... obtained
by capitalizing earnings;"' 0 4 and market value, "the price at which the stock
was selling on the market prior to the action which is objected to, disregard-
ing any change in price due to the action." 0 5 Considering these three values
and assigning them weighted percentages according to their reliability in the
time the opportunity to control was lost was $48 per share. See 384 F. Supp. at 517. To this
amount, the court added $2.40 per share as the value of the lost opportunity to control. Id. at
521-23.
100. See id. at 511-14.
101. See note 123 infra.
102. See generally Adams v. R.C. Williams & Co., 39 Del. Ch. 61, 158 A.2d 797 (Del. Ch.
1960); Jacques Coe & Co. v. Minneapolis-Moline Co., 31 Del. Ch. 368, 75 A.2d 244 (Del. Ch.
1950); see notes 103-05 infra.
103. In re Watt & Shand, 452 Pa. 608, 611 n.7, 304 A.2d 694, 698 n.7 (1973). Inclusion of net
asset value has been criticized insofar as it reflects the stock's liquidation value. Appraisal, these
critics contend, is designed to show the value of the stock as part of a going concern. See, e.g., In
re Marcus, 273 App. Div. 725, 728-29, 79 N.Y.S.2d 76, 79-80 (1st Dep't 1948), appeal dismissed
for failure to prosecute, 302 N.Y. 881, 100 N.E.2d 55 (1951); Kaplan, Problems in the
Acquisition of Shares of Dissenting Minorities, 34 B.U.L. Rev. 291, 299-300 (1954); Note,
Valuation of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1453, 1457-60 (1966).
104. 452 Pa. at 611 n.7, 304 A.2d at 698 n.7. Investment value has been favorably treated by
the commentators. See Kaplan, supra note 103, at 297-300; Note, supra note 103, at 1464-68.
However, many courts have not found it easy to apply due to difficulty in choosing the proper
capitalization ratio. E.g., Francis I. duPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344,
348 (Del. Ch. 1973).
105. 452 Pa. at 611 n.7, 304 A.2d at 698 n.7; see notes 113-20 infra and accompanying text.
Generally market value is heavily favored by the courts. See, e.g., Levin v. Mississippi River
Corp., 59 F.R.D. 353, 370 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem. sub nom. Wesson v. Mississippi River Corp.,
486 F.2d 1398 (2d Cir. 1973); Jones v. Healy, 184 Misc. 923, 55 N.Y.S.2d 349 (Sup. Ct. 1945),
aff'd mem., 270 App. Div. 895, 62 N.Y.S.2d 605, motion for leave to appeal denied, 270 App.
Div. 998, 64 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1st Dep't 1946): "The market may not always appear to be in line
with earnings, dividends, or asset value, but in the market all the factors which enter Into a
realistic determination of value are appraised by those who are most realistic, the actual buyers
and sellers, and the market prices, reflecting the composite judgment of the informed and
interested, are apt to be more significant than any individual opinion." Id. at 936, 55 N.Y.S.2d at
360.
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particular circumstances of the case, the appraiser will derive a figure for the
value of the stock.
Appraisal was developed to give a measure of protection to minority
shareholders, who, while being frozen out, had been offered less than fair
value for their shares. 106 Theoretically appraisal will compensate the minority
shareholder fairly under these circumstances, but such has not always been
the case.'0 7 Probably the most serious problem is the uncertainty created by
the lack of definite fixed weights to be assigned to each value.' 0 8 This is
apparent from examinations of appraisals rendered under Delaware law,
which is substantially identical to that of Pennsylvania. In Francis I. duPont
& Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,' 0 9 claims calculated under the
appraisal method ranged from $52.36 to $131.89 per share, while the ap-
praiser granted $91.47.110 Considerably more disparity is frequently the
case.
I II
Presumably for reasons such as these, 1 2 the Delaware appraisal statute
was amended in 1967 to limit its use to those situations where no active
market existed in the stock in question."13 This followed the view expressed
106. See generally Kaplan, supra note 103; Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting
Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1189 (1964); Note, Freezing Out Minority
Shareholders, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1630 (1961).
107. As Professor Vorenberg recognized, "resort to appraisal will, even under the best of the
statutory procedures, often give the stockholder less than his stock is worth.... Inevitably, the
procedure involves delay and uncertainty, with expenses which may cut into his recovery."
Vorenberg, supra note 106, at 1201 (footnote omitted).
108. Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1453
(1966).
109. 312 A.2d 344 (Del. Ch. 1973).
110. Id. at 350.
111. In In re Olivetti Underwood Corp., 246 A.2d 800 (Del. Ch. 1968), the plaintiffs claimed
that their stock was worth $16.39 per share, while the corporation valued it at $2.85. The
appraiser found it to be worth $11.83, but the court lowered that valuation to $9.78. The
disparities resulted from the following assignments of values and weights by the different
calculators:
Shareholders Corporation Appraiser Court
Earnings Prospects
(Investment Value) $16.00 (25%) $0 (30%) $0 (20%) $0 (25%)
Market Value 14.50 (50%) 9.50 (30%) 14.25 (60%) 14.25 (50%)
Asset Value 20.53 (25%) 0 (30%) 16.38 (20%) 10.62 (25%)
Dividend Value (0%) 0 (10%) (0%) (0%)
Weighted Value $16.39 $2.85 $11.83 $9.78
Id. at 803, 809. Similarly in Adams v. R.C. Williams & Co., 39 Del. Ch. 61, 158 A.2d 797 (Del.
Ch. 1960), the plaintiffs claimed $15 for their $25 preferred stock, while the corporation offered
$4.49. The appraiser found its value to be $9.71. Id. at 63-64, 158 A.2d at 798-99.
112. Vorenberg, supra note 106, at 1203.
113. Del. Code Ann. tiL 8, § 262(k) (1975). The Delaware statute limits use of appraisals to
those situations where the stock is not registered on a national exchange or held of record by more
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by many commentators1 14 and by Judge Weinfeld in Levin v. Mississippi
River Corp. 115 that, where there is an active market in a stock, "[t]heory must
yield to the reality of the market place, 'the true appraiser.' "1116
The market value of a stock also controls in Pennsylvania' 1 7 and in New
York1 18 when there is an existing active market. If there is no current market,
the appraisal. process will attempt to determine value by "constructing" a
market value1 19 through the use of such indicia as comparable corporations,
marketability, net asset value, and investment value, i.e., what the value of
the stock would be if the corporation's shares were actively traded. 120
B. Evaluating the Minority Position
As is readily apparent from Chris-Craft, the tender contest situation is a
hybrid: an active (albeit artificially stimulated) market existed in Piper stock
prior to the battle, but no active market existed for the same shares once the
battle was over. 121 The court of appeals in Chris-Craft commanded that
damages be measured by the reduction in appraisal value of CCI's Piper
holdings as a result of its relegation to a minority position. ' 22
than 2000 stockholders, unless otherwise provided. Id. Indeed, "[t]he Delaware law is that in the
absence of a reliable market for stock, a reconstructed market value 'must be given considera-
tion', if one can be made." Francis I. duPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d
344, 352 (Del. Ch. 1973).
114. See generally Kaplan, supra note 103; Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy:
An Essay For Frank Coker, 72 Yale L.J. 223, 231-32 (1962); Rams, Judicial Valuation of
Dissenting Shareholder Interests, 8 Lincoln L. Rev. 74 (1973).
115. 59 F.R.D. 353 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem. sub nom. Wesson v. Mississippi River Corp.,
486 F.2d 1398 (2d Cir. 1973) (federal common law).
116. Id. at 370.
117. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1515(L) (Cum. Supp. 1974). The Pennsylvania statute limits use
of appraisals to those stocks held by less than 2500 shareholders and listed on neither the New
York nor the American Stock Exchanges. Id.
118. E.g., In re Deutschmann, 281 App. Div. 14, 116 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1st Dep't 1952)
(challenge to market value as proper determinant held vexatious as matter of law); In re Marcus,
273 App. Div. 725, 79 N.Y.S.2d 76 (1st Dep't 1948), appeal dismissed for failure to prosecute,
302 N.Y. 881, 100 N.E.2d 55 (1951) (valuation on basis of going concern, not liquidated value);
Jones v. Healy, 184 Misc. 923, 55 N.Y.S.2d 349 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd mem., 270 App. Div. 895,
62 N.Y.S.2d 605, motion for leave to appeal denied, 270 App. Div. 998, 64 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1st
Dep't 1946) (market value best evidence for all purposes where it fairly reflects opinion of
informed buyers and sellers).
119. See Francis I. duPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344, 352 (Del.
Ch. 1973).
120. See Jones v. Healy, 184 Misc. 923, 55 N.Y.S.2d 349 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd mem., 270
App. Div. 895, 62 N.Y.S.2d 605, motion for leave to appeal denied, 270 App. Div. 998, 64
N.Y.S.2d 170 (1st Dep't 1946).
121. The total percentage of Piper shares acquired from sources other than the Piper family
by BPC and CCI was 67% of all shares issued and outstanding, or over a million shares.
Following the contest and the concluding open market purchases by both CCI and BPC, 6% of
Piper's shares remained outstanding, not nearly enough to maintain a stable market in the event
of sales by CCI. See note 20 supra.
122. 480 F.2d at 380. There is some question as to the court's intent in indicating "appraisal
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On remand, applying Pennsylvania law, the district court employed the
three-factor appraisal method discussed above.' 23 The court took no cogni-
zance of the size of the CCI block. All its evaluations were done on the basis
of a standard 100 share block.1 24 Using this reference, it determined that
since there were no changes in asset, investment, or market values as a result
of BPC taking majority control, '2S there were no damages for reduction to a
minority position. 126 The court concluded that "CC[I] is presently in a posi-
tion no different from that of any minority owner (albeit a large one) of any
publicly held corporation"' 27
However, just as the premium for control inures to a large block of shares
but is absent in any valuation of the same shares using a 100-share block, so
the use of a 100-share block in valuing a minority position cannot com-
prehend the factors appurtenant to the 700,000 share block which CCI
held. 1 2 8 Thus, the district court accepted a $48 per share valuation of the
100-share block as a starting point for its grant of a $2.40 opportunity-for-
control premium.129 Since its valuation of the minority position did not go
beyond the 100-share block, it could not reflect the reduction in value of the
CCI block introduced by such problems as blockage, minority position, and
unmarketability. 130 In applying the appraisal method as strictly as it did, the
value" as the determinant of CCI's damages. A strict application of Pennsylvania's appraisal
statute would require the type of three-factor test applied in In re Watt & Shand, 452 Pa. 608,
304 A.2d 694 (1973). See text accompanying notes 101-05 supra. However, it is doubtful whether
Pennsylvania would have applied this method in light of the active market that existed during the
contest. The Pennsylvania legislature specifically limited appraisals to non-market situations. See
note 116 supra and accompanying text. On remand, the district court applied the appraisal
formula. 384 F. Supp. at 513.
123. See 384 F. Supp. at 512-14 & n.5, citing Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1908 (Cum. Supp.
1974). Pennsylvania law applied because the shares to be appraised were issued by a Pennsyl-
vania corporation, Piper. See Chris-Craft I, 480 F.2d at 350.
124. 384 F. Supp. at 514.
125. Id. at 514-15.
126. Id. at 514.
127. Id. While a 100-share block could be marketed without difficulty, such would not be the
case with a 700,000 share block. See notes 134-38 infra and accompanying text.
128. Cf. Chris-Craft II, 384 F. Supp. at 517 & n.12.
129. Id. at 523.
130. To some extent these factors will be considered in arriving at the three basic values.
especially market value, but where a 100-share unit is the basis for appraisal of a much larger
block, it is submitted that these values should be used as independent factors in reaching an
appraisal price. Many courts, including those of Pennsylvania and Delaware, apparently would
uphold their independent use in a proper case. See Jacques Coe & Co. v. Minneapolis-Moline
Co., 31 Del. Ch. 368, 372, 75 A.2d 244, 246-47 (Del. Ch. 1950) (approved of less arbitrary
procedures for valuation, and inclusion of independent values where proper); Tri-Continental
Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 523, 526, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950) (appraiser must consider "all
factors and elements which reasonably might enter into the fixing of value'); In re Watt & Shand,
452 Pa. 608, 610, 304 A.2d 694, 697-98 (1973) (all relevant factors must be considered in fixing
value).
In Austin v. City Stores Co. (No. 1), 89 Pa. D. & C. 57, 59 (C.P. Philadelphia County 1953),
the court asserted that "[a]sset value; market value; market prices of comparable companies;
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court apparently took the 100-share measure beyond its intended use.' 3'
Appraisal was developed to provide dissident shareholders a fair valuation in
return for surrendering their shares to the issuer when the absence of an
active market prevents disposal of the shares in any other manner. 32 In a
sense, appraisal seeks to discover fair liquidation values for minority posi-
tions. Even if a large minority position is appraised and surrendered, it makes
little difference if blockage or unmarketability exist, since these factors are
eliminated with the tender of the shares. In Chris-Craft, however, this critical
premise was missing: the appraisal would have fairly compensated CCI for the
value of its position only if the blockage, minority, and unmarketability
factors could be eliminated-in other words, if the shares were tendered and
full value received as part of the appraisal. Since CCI continued to hold the
shares, exclusion of the size factor in determining CCI's loss resulted in
substantially less than full compensation for its injury.' 33 Moreover, CCI's
reduction to a minority position was "caused"' 134 by BPC's illegal acquisitions.
A small investor calculates and accepts the risk that the market for his shares
will dissolve and that his shares will consequently be acquired at appraisal
value. CCI took this risk only to the extent that it calculated a certain
likelihood that, in a fairly conducted battle, it would lose. Certainly, to the
extent these calculations were thrown off by BPC's conduct, consideration of
the increase in risk to CCI of reduction to minority status which it could not
have put into its risk analysis should have been considered. Such an approach
should have led to some compensation for reduction to minority status.
The blockage concept recognizes that even if a corporation's stock is widely
held and traded on a national securities exchange, if the block to be marketed
is significantly larger than the normal floating supply (the amount of stock
available for trading at a given time-i.e., the amount held by brokers,
market price and earnings ratio; management and its policies; earnings; dividends; valuation of
assets; reserves for various contingencies; tax liabilities; future earnings; [and] predictions of
future business events... all. .. must be considered and given their proper weight in order that
a just result might be attained." Id. at 59, quoted with approval in In re Watt & Shand, supra at
610, 304 A.2d at 698.
131. See Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 Harv. L. Rev.
1453, 1454 (1966).
132. See generally Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank
Coker, 72 Yale L.J. 223, 226-27 (1962); Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal
Statutes, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1453 (1966); Note, Freezing Out Minority Shareholders, 74 Harv. L.
Rev. 1630, 1634-35 (1961). Appraisal statutes themselves, however, seem to have developed to
allow corporate management more freedom to accommodate dissident minority shareholders
while effecting mergers and acquisitions. See Manning, supra at 227; Note, Valuation of
Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, supra at 1453; Note, Freezing Out Minority
Shareholders, supra at 1630.
133. CCI's experts testifying on the issue of damages estimated that once CCI had been
reduced to a minority position in Piper, CCI's holdings could command between $20 and $30 per
share. Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 31, at 34. Deducted from the $48 per share appraisal
value, such a measurement would indicate a loss to CCI of between $18 and $28 per share. BPC's
experts found CCI's bloc to be virtually unmarketable under existing circumstances, without
BPC's cooperation. Id. at 64.
134. See Chris-Craft I, 480 F.2d at 375-76.
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traders, etc., but not investors), this will severely inhibit the block's marketa-
bility, and correspondingly decrease its market value. 135 This was explicitly
recognized by the Internal Revenue Service in 1958.136 Blockage also recog-
nizes that an inordinately large block of shares thrown on the market at one
time would lead to a significant reduction in market price until the market
absorbs the block.1 37 Blockage discounts have been substantial, ranging as
high as one-third where the block involved represented more than 50 percent
of the floating supply. 138 Moreover, none of these cases dealt with a block
many times the size of the float, such as CCI held.' 39 Expert witnesses agreed
that this block was unmarketable except by a registered public offering. 140
Plaintiff's experts also testified that the discount in this case should substan-
tially exceed the discounts allowed in conventional blockage cases.' 4'
135. "IT]he adjustment for blockage is . . . a recognition of the economic fact that a large
block of stock dumped upon a market not having enough buyers to purchase it at its quoted price
per share will have to be reduced in price in order to be sold." In re Joslyn, 500 F.2d 382, 384
(9th Cir. 1974) (discounting a block by 12%).
136. The IRS had for many years resisted recognizing blockage, but had to do so once "the
judicial attitude hardened from one permitting the trier of fact to consider the blockage effect to a
rule requiring that it be considered ...." Rushton v. Commissioner, 498 F.2d 88, 91 (5th Cir.
1974) (emphasis omitted). The regulation concerning blockage provides that "[iln certain excep-
tional cases, the size of the block of securities ... in relation to the number of shares changing
hands in sales may be relevant in determining whether selling prices reflect the fair market value
of the block of stock to be valued. If the donor can show that the block of stock to be valued...
is so large... that it could not be liquidated in a reasonable time without depressing the market,
the price at which the block could be sold as such outside the usual market, as through an
underwriter, may be a more accurate indication of value than market quotations." 26 C.F.R.
§ 25.2512-2(e) (1974). The courts require that the party claiming the benefit of the blockage rule
must show that a reasonably skilled broker could not have liquidated the block for the assessed
value within a reasonable time. E.g., Rushton v. Commissioner, supra (blockage discount
disallowed where no proof that shares could not be marketed successfully); Richardson v.
Commissioner, 151 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 796 (1946) (same); see
Helvering v. Maytag, 125 F.2d 55"(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 689 (1942) (blockage discount
allowed where shares could not be absorbed into market within reasonable time); Bull v. Smith,
119 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1941) (blockage discount disallowed where it wvas shown that broker could
market shares successfully within a reasonable time period).
137. "It is a matter of common knowledge that the value of any product or commodity,
whether it be wheat, hogs or otherwise, is affected by the law of supply and demand, and that
where the former far exceeds the latter, it has a depressing effect upon value. Reference to the
daily markets of the country support [sic] this statement. No doubt the value of corporate stock is
similarly affected." Commissioner v. Shattuck, 97 F.2d 790, 792 (7th Cir. 1938); see In re JosAyn,
500 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1974); Havemeyer v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 537 (Ct. Cl.), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 759 (1945).
138. Helvering v. Maytag, 125 F.2d 55, 58 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 689 (1942).
139. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
140. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 31, at 34. Indeed, under the circumstances, only
one of the experts who testified for CCI would have distributed the shares, and BPC's expert
would not have done so. Id. at 38. Two witnesses for CCI who managed portfolios indicated that
they would not have considered purchasing the 42% minority interest under any circumstances.
Id. at 37.
141. Appraisals of the minority position by CCI's experts yielded estimates discounting the
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But blockage is only one of the problems facing a defeated tender offeror
attempting to dispose of his holdings. The post-contest target corporation
resembles a closely held corporation more than a publicly held one, with
relatively insignificant trading in its shares. 142 It is demonstrable that the
stock of a closely held corporation generally trades at a lower price than that
of a comparable publicly held corporation.143 In addition, minority positions
in closely held corporations traditionally have been valued at substantial
discounts from net asset value or from comparable positions in actively traded
corporations. 144 As the United States Court of Claims said in Righter v.
United States, 145 a case involving disputed estate taxes:
[T]here is the significant fact that the stock involved here was a minority interest of
only 17 percent in a closely held corporation. It is logical to assume that this would
adversely affect its value if it were offered for sale on the open market, as few people
would be interested in buying it under these circumstances.' 46
Thus, where minority interests in closely held corporations have been trans-
ferred, discounts of one-third have not been unusual. 147
The importance of marketability in valuing a security is again emphasized
by the discounts from market value made in the case of letter stock. In
Kaufman v. Diversified Industries, Inc.,148 the court stated:
Such stock cannot be sold freely to the public and thus has limited marketability. In
brief, although the shares to be delivered were to have a value of $486,377.50 as
defined in the contract, the market value of the shares would actually be significantly
less than the defined value. 14
9
block by between 40% and 60%. Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 31, at 34. Appraisals by
BPC's experts, using a different factual situation-and 100-share units-yielded estimates with-
out discounts at all. Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 30, at 19.
142. The remaining shares amounted to only about 6% of the Piper shares issued, far less
than was necessary to maintain an active market. See note 20 supra.
143. "[A]n unlisted closely held stock of a corporation. .. in which trading is infrequent and
which therefore lacks marketability, is less attractive than a similar stock which is listed on an
exchange and has ready access to the investing public. This factor would naturally affect the
market value of the stock." Central Trust Co. v. United States, 305 F.2d 393, 405 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
144. E.g., Richardson v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
796 (1946) (substantial difference found between the price which could be obtained for minority
interests in closely held corporations and prices based on asset value); Drybrough v. United
States, 208 F. Supp. 279, 287 (W.D. Ky. 1962) (same); Cravens v. Welch, 10 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.
Cal. 1935) (minority interests in a close corporation worth much less than the proportionate share
of assets of the enterprise). See note 143 supra.
145. 439 F.2d 1204 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
146. Id. at 1218.
147. E.g., Drybrough v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 279 (W.D. Ky. 1962) (discount of 35%
applied to 45% interest in closely held corporation); Whittemore v. Fitzpatrick, 127 F. Supp. 710
(D. Conn. 1954) (discount of 33% applied to minority interest).
148. 460 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1038 (1972).
149. Id. at 1335. In Thomas v. Duralite Co., (Current Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
94,864 (D.N.J. Nov. 7, 1974), the court stated that "lettered stock [was] worth really only a
fraction of the stock then actually free to trade." Id. at 96,943; accord, Alloys Unlimited, Inc. v.
Gilbert, 319 F. Supp. 617, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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In Kaufman, a discount of fifty percent was considered a reasonable reflection
of unmarketability. 5 0
The tender contest situation, readily exemplified by Chris-Craft, involves
all the discounting factors noted previously: an enormous blockage which
could not-be absorbed by the market even if one indeed existed;"' a
substantial minority position in a structurally closed corporation;' s2 and the
inherent discount introduced into any but a majority position by lack of an
active market' 5 3 Any appraisal of the CCI shares that failed to take these
factors into consideration would considerably over-value the shares, and
thereby unreasonably diminish CCrs recoverable damages for its reduction to
a minority position.
VI. CONCLUSION
In order to determine reasonable compensatory damages to a defeated
contestant in a battle of tender offers aimed at takeover of a target corpora-
tion, two factors should have been considered by the Chris-Craft court. First,
the opportunity to control the target should have been evaluated by determin-
ing the value of control under the particular circumstances involved, and then
discounting that sum by the percentage probability that control would not
have been won had the battle been fairly fought by BPC. In determining the
value of control, the amount the contestants were willing to pay for Piper
shares and control should have been the starting point, and such factors as
the impact of BPC as a minority shareholder and the potential emnity of
Piper management, as well as the skills-or lack thereof-which CCI would
bring to Piper's business should have been given appropriate consideration.
The Chris-Craft court did fairly assess these factors to arrive at damages for
CCI's loss of opportunity to control Piper. IS4 Second, the loss of value of the
contestant's stock by being reduced to a minority position should have been
evaluated by the court by either appraisal or market examination, depending
upon the existence or possible construction of reliable market values. Under
either method of valuation, the contestant's position should have been mea-
sured as it actually existed, not in hypothetical terms such as 100-share
blocks. Only in this way could the court properly evaluate such valid
discounting factors as blockage, minority position, and lack of an active
trading market. Using such valuations presented the only realistic method of
fully compensating the defeated contestant. Chris-Craft failed to take these
factors into consideration, Is s and thereby deprived CCI of the damages
resulting from the practical unmarketability of its minority block.
It is submitted, then, that Chris-Craft is sound guidance on only one of the
150. See 460 F.2d at 1335; cf. Penn Yan Agway Cooperative, Inc. v. United States, 417 F.2d
1372 (CL Cl. 1969) (cooperative bank stock not redeemable for several years, and then only at
face value, discounted 93% from face value).
151. See notes 133-39 supra and accompanying text.
152. See notes 142-47 supra and accompanying text.
153. See notes 148-50 supra and accompanying texL
154. 384 F. Supp. at 518-23.
155. See notes 130-33 supra and accompanying text.
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two major remedial questions it addresses. A defeated tender offeror, like any
other litigant, will properly object to the award of one fortune when fraud
has deprived it of two. Chris-Craft had the opportunity to set definitive
guidelines on valuation of the loss of opportunity to control in the tender offer
context. The court's failure to take into account reduction to minority status
leads to the conclusion that the court lost this opportunity. It is hoped that the
Second Circuit will recognize the injury consequent to CCI's wrongful reduc-
tion to a minority position. Failing that, one must hope that stare decisis will
yield to reason, and that Chris-Craft will survive only to the limited extent
that its soundness warrants.
[After this Note went to press, the Second Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court decision in Chris-Craft on the issue of damages. 156 Writing for
the panel, Judge Timbers took exception to the methods used in computing
damages by the district court, emphasizing that damages must reflect the
amount CCI could have realized in a sale of its shares. 157 Without de-
nominating it as such, the court applied a "greater of cost or value" measure
of damages, 158 finding that CCI had paid an average of $63.98 per share. 15 9
To measure CCI's loss, the court rejected use of a 100-share block, declaring
that such an approach would defeat the intent of the court's earlier deci-
sion. 160 Instead, it determined that the market value of CCI's block as a
700,000 share unit was $27 per share, noting that problems inherent in
attempting to market such a large minority interest in a de facto closed
corporation would significantly reduce the value of the shares. 161 The court
thus fixed CCI's damages at $36.98 per share. In its analysis and conclu-
sions, the court's opinion is similar to the criticisms of the lower court opinion
developed in this Note. 162 On the issues of consequential damages, 163
attorneys' fees, 164 and injunctive relief, 165 the Second Circuit affirmed the
district court decision.]
Arthur P. Lowenstein
156. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., Nos. 74-2542, 75-7003 (2d Cir., Apr.
11, 1975).
157. Id. at 2847-48, 2858-59.
158. See note 31 supra.
159. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., Nos. 74-2542, 75-7003, at 2849-53 (2d
Cir., Apr. 11, 1975).
160. Id. at 2847-48.
161. Id. at 2858-59.
162. See notes 121-53 supra and accompanying text.
163. See note 23 supra.
164. See note 23 supra.
165. See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
